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MODELS OF CHURCH-STATE INTERACTION AND THE
STRATEGY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Ira C. Lupu*
I will begin by laying some groundwork before I comment on Pro-
fessor McConnell's essay. First, unlike most or all of those individu-
als contributing to this symposium, I am neither Christian nor insti-
tutionally religious in any other way. As the symposium progressed,
I sometimes felt like I had wandered into the wrong tent. Recalling
the purpose of the Conference helped me reorient myself. In the
invitation to participate in this event, Craig Mousin had described
the meeting as one in which scholars of theology, divinity, religious
ethics, and law might converse across conventional disciplinary
boundaries.1 And, quite consistent with that design, I have been pro-
voked today in new directions, although what I have to say might
not reveal that.
Second, I must admit that I had trouble getting my mind around
the topic description for this particular panel. The assigned topic is
"Law's Perspective of Religion and Its View of the State." I have
assumed that the antecedent of "Its" is "Religion." So, as I under-
stand it, we are to focus on law's view of religion's view of the state.
As I squinted at the odd way light passed through the prism cre-
ated by this formulation, the analogy that came to me was that of
asking a husband what he thought of what he thought his wife
thought of him. Of course, he could make no sense out of that other
than as a question about what he thought of his marriage; that is,
what was his view of the relationship given whatever perceptions he
had - but they would only be his perceptions - of her view of the
relationship.
To some extent, Professor McConnell's remarks helped to ground
* L.H. Mayo Research Professor of Law, National Law Center, The George Washington Uni-
versity. This article is a revised version of comments presented at the Conference on the Bicenten-
nial of the Bill of Rights sponsored by The Center for Church/State Studies, DePaul University
College of Law, held in Chicago on December 6 and 7, 1991.
1. See Craig B. Mousin, Confronting The Wall of Separation: A New Dialogue Between Law
and Religion on the Meaning of the First Amendment, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1992).
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my approach to the topic. Professor McConnell's comments about
models of the church-state relationship do not overtly adopt or cri-
tique anyone's perspective; it is not clear to me what, in Professor
McConnell's view, reflects law's perspective and what reflects reli-
gion's perspective. Rather, and attractively and usefully, Professor
McConnell appears to be striving for an Olympian perspective. He
attempts first to catalogue objectively the ways in which church and
state interact, and then to assess the legal significance of those rela-
tional arrangements.
Of course, much recent scholarship in law, literature, and philoso-
phy has reflected skepticism of intellectual efforts to locate objective
positions from which to assess or describe social phenomena. 2 We in
the academy have been hearing that, to the postmodern conscious-
ness, there is not very much there there. If the critique of objectivity
is correct, then Professor McConnell's view is less timeless and uni-
versal, and more situated and contingent, than his remarks would
suggest. The tension between the objective and the subjective is
hardly new in this context. The law of the religion clauses has al-
ways combined efforts to render an objective view of constitutional
history and purpose with the need to map those judgments onto the
contemporary culture of religion and society. Even if there were a
consensus concerning religion clause history and purpose, the con-
tent of that contemporary culture, and what it may be in the process
of becoming, are always contestable matters.
In any event, Professor McConnell has painted with a very broad
brush. At the risk of disappointing those who invited me, I am in-
clined to reach for instruments with fewer and finer bristles. My
mistakes are less apparent when I paint in smaller strokes.
Professor McConnell mentions seven models of church-state inter-
action, but I think there are only two models of church-state inter-
action with which the law is concerned. The first is the model of
conflict. The law is generally about conflict and its resolution, so the
model of conflict generates a familiar legal perspective on human
struggles, social institutions, and their relationship with the state. In
church-state clashes, the problem is two-sided: First, disputes be-
tween the state and agents of religion frequently result in dangers
for religious liberty, and second, such disputes may also threaten
injury to the state's legitimate purposes. When, for example, sick
2. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1 (1984) (critiquing the idea of legal objectivity).
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children die after their custodians treat them by religious rather
than conventional medical means, the conflict that may follow poses
hazards to adherents of such religions and to the child-protecting
concerns of the state.$
The second relevant model is that of church-state alignment. This
one also has two sides. First, there is ongoing constitutional concern
that the state not be overly unified with, or captured by, religious
forces. That sort of takeover presents the danger of serious evils:
suppressing dissent, overpowering conscience, corrupting religion,
undermining religious equality, and ultimately destroying democ-
racy. The other side of the capture problem relates to the degrading
effect that state subsidy to religion may accomplish. When the state
aids religion, it may do so on terms which undermine the religious
community's commitments. If religious communities are financially
strapped, or simply interested in growing larger and richer, they be-
come vulnerable to envelopment by the state and seduction by
worldly concerns.4
From law's perspective, Professor McConnell's model of the
"Church Apart From Culture" makes little sense. The contempo-
rary state has common concern for all of its citizens. Because the
state is always cognizant of homicide, for example, the state is going
to be concerned with homicide in the religious community - by its
members against each other, by outsiders against its members, by
its members against outsiders - in precisely the same way that the
state is going to be concerned with homicide involving persons with
no connection to that religious community. The state will react, and
conflict is likely, if the religious community says, "No, our rules
about homicide are different than yours and we want to enforce our
own," or if the religious community says: "Our rules about homicide
are the same as yours, but we consider ourselves sovereign. You
cannot enforce your rules on our territory." Jurisdictional barriers
of the latter type may of course be masks for substantive variations
in the relevant law or enforcement patterns.
3. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) (holding that the prosecution
of a mother on charges of manslaughter and child endangerment for treating her critically ill child
with spiritual rather than medical means did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of state or
federal constitutions where the child's medical condition was life threatening), cert. denied, 491
U.S. 905 (1989).
4. My initial Conference remarks on this subject focused solely on the danger of the church
capturing the state. I would like to thank Stan Ingber for reminding me that capture is as two-
way a path as conflict.
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When a religious community assumes that sort of "apartness,"
state officials are likely to become especially troubled. Physical
"apartness" alone produces no conflict; normative apartness is where
the trouble starts.' The question of Native American tribal jurisdic-
tion over reservation territory, and tribal sovereignty over substan-
tive criminal law applied on such territory, is an intriguing example
of this sort of problem."
In more primitive times and places, it may have been possible to
keep conflict of this kind at a minimum and to keep apartness at a
maximum. The state we currently inhabit, however, is pervasive in
its regulatory concern. It is concerned with many economic aspects
of a church's institutional activity, including fund-raising and labor
relations. The state is also concerned with domestic relations, in-
cluding who marries whom, how spouses treat one another, how
families educate their children, and what constitutes abuse or neg-
lect of children. As soon as the state's purposes extend pervasively
into all matters of economic and domestic life, it is impossible for
religious communities to remain apart from the state.7 Inevitably,
church and state will clash.
A key element within Professor McConnell's continuum of models
is the concern for "influence" - the church influencing culture, and
the church aligned with culture. But here the law is legitimately
mindful only of influence which reaches the point of significant cap-
ture. Most efforts by the church to shape culture - for example, by
the presentation of moral arguments, dissenting from prevailing so-
cial or political views, through various means of communication -
are strenuously protected by legal principles concerning freedom of
expression. Although Professor McConnell correctly observes that
our constitutional law has occasionally been hostile to this proposi-
5. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983) (suggesting that we create and maintain a normative uni-
verse of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void, and in the context of the
narrative we give these legal institutions or prescriptions meaning).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (holding that Congress may, con-
sistent with the Constitution, subject an Indian who commits a crime against a non-Indian on
Indian territory to federal criminal jurisdiction, while leaving to state jurisdiction crimes commit-
ted by non-Indians against other non-Indians on Indian territory).
7. See Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 743, 751
(1992) ("[A]s all examples of religious accommodation tend to demonstrate, we cannot simply
leave religion alone, because in an interdependent and complex society, religion cannot leave us
alone.").
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tion, 8 those moments have been few and have very much faded in
importance.' When the church tries to capture the state and turn it
to some sectarian end, however, the alignment concern grows to a
matter of legal and constitutional significance. 10
No doubt, all of Professor McConnell's suggested models contrib-
ute to our social, cultural, political, and theological understanding of
church-state interaction. For most constitutional lawyers' purposes,
however, only conflict and capture matter. Accordingly, we have two
religion clauses in the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause,
at least in theory - it has not worked out so well in practice lately 1
- is designed to mediate conflict between the state on the one hand,
and religious communities and individuals on the other. The Estab-
lishment Clause is designed to police and limit captures. Those are
the law's two concerns, and those clauses are the Constitution's em-
bodiment of them.
Having so narrowed the inquiry, I want to re-expand it by turning
to the Madisonian concern, in no way limited to religion, about the
role of factions in the Republic.' Madison worried about the danger
8. Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 191, 216-17 (1992).
9. Chief Justice Burger midwifed the idea that participation by religious institutions in politi-
cal debate was a constitutional vice. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611-25 (1971). Later,
however, he helped strangle it. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79, 685-86 (1984). See
generally Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entangle-
ment of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1980)
(detailing the sources of the rule of interpretation known as the "political divisiveness" test,
whereby the Court invalidates legislation if it might tend to create "political division along reli-
gious lines," acd offering two reasons for abandoning the test).
10. Because we have thus far been very restrictive about aid to religious institutions, the second
capture concern - state capturing church by subsidy and conditional entitlement - has been of
less worry. Those restrictions are, however, in the process of breaking down. See Bowen v. Ken-
drick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). In Bowen, the Court held that the Federal Adolescent Family Life
Act, which authorizes federal grants to public and private organizations or agencies for services
and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy, and requires
involvement of, among others, religious and charitable organizations, does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. Id. at 600-18; see also Lupu, supra note 7, at 764-66 (discussing the changes in
Establishment Clause principles suggested by Bowen). Because Bowen appears to permit a signifi-
cant amount of state aid to religion, the concern about unconstitutional conditions on such aid
may soon be revitalized. But see Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding a regulation
imposing a restrictive condition on abortion-related speech by medical personnel to pregnant fe-
male clients in federally funded family planning clinics). Rust may signal the demise of any seri-
ous judicial concern with rights-restricting benefit conditions, at least so long as the condition
attaches only to the use of the monies and not to the behavior of benefit grantees more generally.
11. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), is widely viewed as signalling the
demise of federal constitutional mediation of most forms of such conflict.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 129 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Write ed., 1961).
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of government being captured by groups that might use the power
of the state to tyrannize others."3 Are churches different from other
kinds of factions in the extent or quality of this danger?" Are
churches different from political parties, labor unions, business
groups, or any other group whose leaders and members view them-
selves as having common interests and which seek to capture the
state to achieve their own purposes, even if it means imposing some
harm on third parties?
That the First Amendment contains separate and distinct clauses
pertaining to religion suggests that the Founding Generation be-
lieved that there was a difference between churches and other fac-
tional entities. Political parties are free to try to capture the state;
ordinarily, that is primary among the purposes for which political
parties exist. Such parties criticize state policy and administration
when they are out of office, and then seek to gain power and take
-the machinery of the state and turn it to their own ends. Nothing in
the Constitution explicitly restricts this behavior, and rights of ex-
pression and association protected by constitutional law facilitate or-
dinary efforts by parties to seize the reins of government. The Fram-
ers, however, obviously thought - and many contemporary
Americans continue to believe - that religious factions represent a
different kind of phenomenon than political parties or other kinds of
associations.
One of the central authorities in Judeo-Christian religion provides
a provocative avenue into the distinction between religion and other
association-inspiring causes. The text of the Ten Commandments -
its decalogical character neatly parallel to the Bill of Rights -
serves up an insight in its very first command, and, in so doing,
helps to explain the First Amendment to the Constitution.
My research turned up two versions of the First Commandment.
They are not identical, but each in its own way suggests insights
into the difference between religion and other forms of faction. The
New Oxford Annotated Bible version of the First Commandment is:
"Then God spoke all these words, 'I am the Lord your God, who
brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.
You shall have no other gods before me.' "15 The New English Bible
13. Id.
14. See William P. Marshall, The Public Square and the Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. (forthcoming 1993).
15. Exodus 20:1-:3 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha).
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has a somewhat different version: "God spoke and these were his
words, 'I am the Lord your God who brought you out of Egypt, out
of the land of slavery. You shall have no other god to set against
Me.' "16
Both of these versions of the First Commandment reveal the
power and danger of'religious commitment; its claims on loyalty are
overwhelming. The first version - "no other gods before Me" -
says, in effect, "Me first!!" Even if it is acceptable to have other
gods - a question elided in this version - this translation of the
Commandment establishes an unyielding rule of priority. In case of
conflict between the God-Author of the Commandment and other
gods, the God-Author says "Me first!"
The second version of the First Commandment - "You shall
have no other god to set against Me" - suggests a slightly different
relationship, one we might understand as capturing an antirivalry
spirit: "You can have other gods. Just keep them in separate
spheres, please, and don't make them My rivals. And then there will
be no conflict; then they won't be set against Me."
As we have seen, however, this second version, captured in the
images of apartness, separate spheres, the garden and the wilder-
ness,17 does not map well against contemporary life. When the state
and religious communities come into conflict - as they inevitably
will if religious communities are normative and seriously self-con-
scious about what they do - the idea of separate spheres just does
not work very well. There will be conflict and rivalry, and there will
inevitably arise the problem of competing loyalties.
Reflecting on these dynamics against the backdrop of the "Me
First!" version of the First Commandment enables us to see why we
need religion-specific clauses in the Constitution. Throughout this
Conference, speakers have been talking about the sovereignty of
God. Those claims are set against the competing claims of the sover-
16. Exodus 20:1-:3 (The New English Bible with the Apocrypha).
17. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND Gov-
ERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5-10 (1965) (suggesting that Roger Williams
represented a "strain of thought" for which the wall of separation between church and state was
intended to protect the church from the corrupting influence of the state, but not to shield the
state from the church). Howe took his title from an image coined by Roger Williams of Rhode
Island - "[WIhen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden
of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed
the candlestick, and made his garden a wilderness, as at this day." Id. at 5-6. See also Timothy L.
Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundation of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455, 481-82
(1991) (crediting Williams as the father of the modern "Secular City," as does Howe).
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eignty of the state and those who act in its name.
We all understand the dangers of expansive sovereignty claims.
Think about totalitarian political parties. There are many reasons
why German National Socialism, and Chinese- or Soviet-style Com-
munism, stir our fears. Part of that apprehension arises from our
reaction to the totalitarian party that makes "Me first!" claims in
every matter of behavior and belief. For reasons that derive both
from nationalism and from love of liberty, we in this society are not
very hospitable to "Me first!" claims by intermediate associations.
For better or worse, we are more inclined to accept "Me first!"
claims from the state, or, more typically, from ourselves. Labor un-
ions and civic associations and other kinds of factions thus do not
ordinarily say, "Me first!" They make claims on loyalty, but they
are usually prepared to yield to the demands of the state at one pole
and the deeply felt needs of their constituent members at the other.
Typically, such associations make such claims only in rare, crisis-
oriented moments.
Religion is different.' 8 Religious leaders are more likely than
other associational leaders to make ultimate truth claims and to de-
mand ultimate loyalties, all in the name of Higher Authority. Be-
cause religious factions may not be able to assert these claims and
demands while simultaneously maintaining allegiance to the state,
such factions present unusually difficult problems for government.
The loyalty conflicts engendered by church-state disputes over nor-
mative matters may be serious, not easily compromised, and both
socially and psychologically stressful.
Indeed, state establishment of a church or churches may seem
attractive for this very reason; instead of setting up a problem of
dual loyalty, they try to solve it by uniting its antagonists. For those
outside the official church, however, establishments aggravate and
multiply the problem of conflicting loyalties. How can one maintain
allegiance to a state which officially rejects one's own religious
18. So are families, but they tend to be numerically small; when religion threatens to make
them larger, thereby creating a double-barreled problem of higher loyalty, the state knows exactly
how to intervene aggressively. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding
a lower court's rejection of a free exercise claim and concluding that the bigamy conviction of a
Mormon leader was proper despite his claim he engaged in polygamous marriages for religious
reasons). Professor Gedicks's Conference remarks about Mormon polygamy and the federal gov-
ernment's response to it in the Western territories poignantly captured this experience. Fredrick
M. Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 167 (1992). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 254 (1992) ("Polygamy con-
duces to the creation of powerful families, offsetting [state] power .... ").
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creed? Moreover, if the church or its adherents maintain any legacy
of independence, the problem of conflicting loyalties does not disap-
pear even for those on the inside.
There are a number of constitutional strategies one might ad-
vance to deal with the linked problems of conflict, alignment, and
the pressure of dual loyalties. One might seek to write and interpret
the Constitution so as to increase the likelihood that the society
would contain a few, relatively quiet, large, bureaucratic churches,
all of which had been essentially co-opted by the state. Interpreta-
tions of the Establishment Clause that freely permitted financial aid
to religious institutions, coupled with interpretations of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause that permitted substantial regulation of such institu-
tions, would be a means of promoting such arrangements. The state
would pursue this strategy by subsidizing religion and simultane-
ously tying the subsidy to conformity with policies designed to mini-
mize the danger of church-state conflict.
The danger of this strategy is that once a church gets sufficiently
large and bureaucratic, it may be in a position to seek political
power: it will have popular support, resources, widely known leaders,
and efficient organization, and the danger of capture may suddenly
be reversed. The church may begin to co-opt the state, instead of
the other way around.
The best way to minimize the danger of capture in either direc-
tion is to structure constitutional arrangements so as to increase the
likelihood of having a multiplicity of sects. This is the vision of
James Madison, 9 who had borrowed it from Adam Smith." Cer-
tain interpretations of the religion clauses will reinforce this strat-
egy. For example, constitutional law incentives to channel aid to in-
dividuals rather than religious institutions will increase the
possibility of religious mobility and schism.2 Doctrines that produce
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 358 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Write ed., 1961)
("In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights, It
consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of
sects.").
20. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
744-46 (Edwin Carman ed., 1937) (1776) (arguing that nonestablishment promotes a multiplicity
of sects, as -well as equality and harmony among them).
21. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (holding that the state educational tax
deduction for school expenses, including parochial school tuition, does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause); see generally Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in
theU.S. Constitution, 18 U. CONN. L. REV. 739, 749-53 (1986) (explaining that recent cases have
drawn a distinction between aid to religious institutions and aid to individuals who attend such
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free exercise rights in individuals and small religious associations,
but not in large, bureaucratic religious institutions, will similarly en-
hance this strategy.2"
The model of sect multiplicity conjures an image of lean, mean,
zealous sects. Indeed, after listening to the presentations at this
Conference, I will henceforth envision Stanley Hauerwas as the per-
sonification of such religious groups. These sects are not large, not
bureaucratic, and not co-opted. Unfortunately, such sects may not
want to stay lean. The members of each may be convinced that
they, and only they, know the True Path. They may seek to prosely-
tize, and they consequently may have some trouble getting along
with each other. That is, a world of lean, mean, zealous sects may
not be a world of mutual respect and toleration; it is rather more
likely to be characterized by perpetual religious strife.
A society so riven with religious combat would not be one in
which most of us, Hauerwas excepted perhaps, would be very com-
fortable. Moreover, the church-state conflict in such a world would
probably be intense, socially troublesome, and unending. Indeed, or-
ganizing a state at all in such a world might be impossible; the nec-
essary commonality among individuals and groups might be com-
pletely lacking.
Perhaps the Madison-Smith vision is one of sects that are lean,
but neither mean nor zealous toward others. So long as humans are
free to organize, express themselves, and adopt differing answers to
life's ultimate questions, however, one should expect that proselytiz-
ing zeal and animosity will be a likely byproduct of a multiplicity of
sects. After a stretch in a society inhabited by such groups, we
might begin to long for a few large, bureaucratic, co-opted
churches, despite the risk of state capture they present.
To be sure, many cultural forces will influence the shape of our
institutional religious arrangements far more powerfully than the
content of constitutional law. It would be absurd to believe that
American religious forms are essentially determined by the interpre-
tations of the religion clauses we adopt. Nevertheless, I do believe
that constitutional interpretations matter, at least at the margin. As
a result, I am willing to give constitutional law a smidgen of credit
institutions).
22. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and Religious Institutions: The Case
of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987) (criticizing free exercise exemptions
for institutions).
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for the mix of religious arrangements we do have - some large and
bureaucratic, some lean and intense, and many between. All can
survive, and most can flourish in proportion to the support provided
by their adherents. It would be a mistake in constitutional strategy
- one that we have so far avoided - to adopt a view of either or
both religion clauses that strongly privileged any of these types of
arrangements over the others. What some have seen as incoherence
in the constitutional law of religion may thus represent a shrewder
calculus of statecraft than has heretofore been recognized, or may
reflect a wise, invisible, and providential hand guiding decision.
.The optimum constitutional strategy, I am convinced, must be si-
multaneously respectful of religious liberty and sensitive to the dual
danger of religious combat in the society and religious takeover of
government at any level. A mix of legal rules reflective of all those
ends should always be our target. Even if we all agreed on these
general aims, however, we would reasonably expect unceasing argu-
ment concerning the soundest choice of rules and the best combina-
tion among them.
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